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Abstract 
An important dimension of product differentiation and segregation for specialty 
crops is the added handling and transaction costs incurred. Some forms of business 
organization may realize lower costs of providing such services, and if specialty crop 
production is growing relative to commodity production, these two factors may have 
implications for industry structure. We use data from an Iowa grain handling survey to 
test hypotheses developed in the non-empirical transaction-costs literature with respect to 
organizational and financial governance of cooperatives and private and corporate firms. 
Preliminary results are discussed with respect to business organizations, added costs, 
investments, crops, and contracting. 
 
Keywords: contracting, cooperatives, corporations, grain handling, industry structure, 
segregation, specialty crops, transaction costs.
  
 
 
 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND SEGREGATION IN 
AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS: NON-GENETICALLY MODIFIED AND 
SPECIALTY CORN AND SOYBEAN CROPS IN IOWA 
Introduction 
Providing consumers with choices through the use of specialty products has the po-
tential to enhance welfare, as long as identity is preserved in food and feed products for 
consumers and intermediate product users. If choice is denied to the consumer of the 
product, such as through mixing undifferentiated genetically modified (GM) and non-GM 
commodity products, the welfare-enhancing gains of product differentiation may not be 
fully realized, although the consumer may still benefit through lower-cost products. 
Therefore, systems for identity preservation and product segregation hold value in 
product markets. 
An important issue when considering segregation of specialty crops is the added seg-
regation costs incurred by the grain handling system for segregating differentiated 
products. Speculation on and estimates of such costs range from a few cents to dollars per 
bushel, depending on the assumptions made and the data used (Miranowski et al. 1999; 
Good and Bender 2001). Differences in these costs may have important implications for 
the structure of the grain handling industry.  
But, to date, this issue has received little attention. If specialty grain production is 
growing relative to commodity corn and soybean production, this shift in relative impor-
tance could have significant structural implications. More specifically, if one form of 
business organization—the private firm (including a corporation) versus the coopera-
tive—has cost advantages over other forms in providing product segregation services, 
then that form of business organization will control an increasing share of the food and 
feed markets over time.  
In addition, potential efficiency gains in product differentiation and segregation may 
be realized by extending organizational control: replacing markets with contracts and 
2 / Miranowski, Jensen, Batres-Marquez, and Ishdorj 
vertically integrating components of the food system (e.g., input supply, production, 
marketing, processing, and distribution). The implications of such actions can be exten-
sive and can have significant impacts on rural producers, consumers, and communities. 
Further, concerns over the safety and global acceptance of GM products will create even 
greater pressure for development and enforcement of product segregation systems and 
provide incentives for further integration in the food system. 
In this paper, we use a transaction-costs framework based on the new industrial or-
ganization literature and provide a rationale for decreasing transaction costs as the 
business organization of grain handlers moves from cooperatives to hybrid forms of 
organization to private (and corporate) ownership. The decreasing-cost hypothesis is 
tied to both the business organization form and the financial governance structure and 
helps to explain how the business structure may change with increasing asset specific-
ity. The transaction-costs framework motivates our detailed look at the costs of grain 
handling in Iowa. 
In order to compare costs of alternative product segregation systems operating within 
different market structures, we survey Iowa grain handlers. The added costs of product 
segregation for corn and soybeans, including testing, handling, and storage, are collected 
from grain handlers identified by their form of business organization. These data are 
disaggregated by form of business organization (private and corporate ownership and 
cooperative), size of firm or enterprise, degree of market system integration, and product 
value added through product differentiation and segregation. The results allow detailed 
analyses of transaction costs for alternative business organizations and market structures 
and identification of incentives for food system integration and evolution to alternative 
forms of business organization.  
This paper provides the conceptual basis for the study and results from a 2003 survey 
of Iowa grain handlers. The next section presents the conceptual framework for tying 
changing industry structure to changing transaction costs. The data survey and collection 
from the 2003 survey of Iowa grain handlers are then described. The analytical results 
section presents statistics from the survey and identifies some implications.  
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Conceptual Framework 
The modern transaction-costs literature provides a partial analysis framework for ex-
plaining economic phenomena. Organizational structures evolve to minimize transaction 
costs. Likewise, industry structure evolves to minimize overall transaction costs. Firms 
rely on input markets until the market-purchased inputs cost them more than does verti-
cally integrating with suppliers. All components of the economic system are driven by the 
need to minimize transaction costs or to adjust in other ways.  
Obviously, the transaction-costs model is more successful in explaining evolution 
within the economic system during periods of changing transaction costs than during 
periods of relatively stable transaction costs (Williamson 1991). For example, the infor-
mation revolution of the 1990s would be expected to have created major adjustments in 
marketing practices, prevalent forms of business organization, contracting, and industry 
structure, including vertical and lateral integration, as transaction costs changed with new 
information technology. 
Transaction-costs proponents (e.g., Williamson 1985) argue that contracts are in-
complete because it is too costly to include all relevant contingencies in an ex ante 
exchange. Contract incompleteness puts investors in a weak ex post bargaining 
position when specific and irreversible investments are required ex ante. Thus, the 
investor may not invest in the highest surplus-generating project, creating an ineffi-
cient hold-up problem. Suitable governance structures, characterized by who has the 
decision authority and who is the residual claimant, may reduce or alleviate the hold-
up problem. 
Organizational Governance  
There are two dimensions of governance that are important from a transaction-costs 
perspective: organizational governance (Williamson 1991) and financial governance 
(Williamson 1988). The first, organizational governance, concerns who controls the firm 
and dominates the firm’s governance decisions. In this regard, cooperatives differ from 
private or corporate ownership. Input suppliers or farmers control agricultural marketing 
cooperatives. Farmers supply the raw commodities or inputs and provide capital for the 
cooperative’s investments. Private firms and corporations are owned and controlled by 
individuals and shareholders, who are the residual claimants but who do not supply inputs 
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to the firm. Thus, the ex post bargaining position of the supplier and purchaser will depend 
on the organizational structure being considered. 
Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) articulated a conceptual framework of evolving busi-
ness organization from agricultural marketing cooperatives through integrated, corporate 
marketing systems. Control through markets or through vertically integrated enterprises 
relates to the nature and structure of costs. Market governance is generally preferred 
when asset specificity is low and the incidence of hold-up problems is low. Vertical 
integration becomes more attractive as asset specificity and, associated with it, the 
incidence of hold-up problems increases. Hybrids of the two organizational forms may 
succeed with intermediate levels of asset specificity. Cooperatives are better suited to 
competitive markets and situations of low asset specificity, at least lower than that 
required by their members in supplying inputs to the cooperative. Cooperatives generally 
have lower costs at lower levels of asset specificity than do private firms. Private firms 
and, especially, corporations are better suited to situations demanding higher asset 
specificity and generally have lower costs than do cooperatives with increasing asset 
specificity. More vertically integrated systems are typically characterized by higher asset 
specificity. 
Following Williamson (1991), the costs of different organizational forms are as-
sumed to increase with asset specificity but at different rates. For cooperatives, the 
organizational costs are assumed to be lower for low levels of asset specificity but to 
increase more rapidly at higher levels of asset specificity. Private and corporate owner-
ship organizational costs are higher at lower levels of asset specificity but increase less 
rapidly with increasing asset specificity. The organizational costs of hybrid forms are in 
between those of cooperatives and private firms as asset specificity increases. These 
trade-offs are depicted in Figure 1, where costs vary by asset specificity (s) for three 
organizational structures: cooperatives and market governance (C); private, corporate, 
and vertically integrated systems (P); and hybrid forms of governance (X).  
How would the organizational form influence the costs of specialty crop segregation 
and identity preservation, or why would we hypothesize that private firms should have 
cost advantages over cooperatives in handling specialty grains and oilseeds? With 
increasing asset specificity required for identity preservation and product segregation, the 
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Source: Williamson 1991. 
FIGURE 1. Organizational structure and asset specificity 
 
organizational costs of cooperatives increase more rapidly than do those of private 
firms. Farmer members provide the necessary equity for marketing cooperatives. As 
long as asset specificity is low for the marketing cooperative and lower than the level 
of asset specificity for its members’ own production operation, the opportunity cost of 
the equity remains low to members. As asset specificity of the marketing cooperative 
increases, the median farmer member may not vote for a more asset specific or special-
ized investment.  
Financial Governance 
The second dimension of governance relates to financial governance. Financial gov-
ernance addresses debt and equity as financial governance instruments in transaction-
costs economics. Financial instruments are important because they specify control rights 
and how returns depend on outcomes (Williamson 1988). Debt instruments have rigid 
contracts, and the creditor has prior claim in the case of bankruptcy. Because debt in-
struments are characterized by standard contract rules, design costs are low. Debt is not 
designed to deal with unforeseen contingencies, nor does it permit efficient adjustments 
Cost of  
Organizational 
Structure 
Asset Specificity (s) 
X(s) 
P(s) 
C(s)
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ex post. Because debt contracts are restricted to a few standard rules, the cost of debt rises 
sharply when the level of asset specificity increases.  
In contrast, equity gives financiers the rights of control and the role of residual 
claimants (Williamson 1988; Hendrikse and Veerman 2001). The appointed board of 
directors has the power to control management and adjust decisions. With increasing 
asset specificity, equity capital costs are lower than debt costs. Because equity is more 
complex than debt when control mechanisms are built in, the start-up costs of equity are 
initially greater than the debt costs. Thus, debt will be used for projects with low asset 
specificity and equity will be used for high-specificity projects with hybrid financial 
forms at intermediate levels of asset specificity. Figure 2 illustrates the hypothesized 
relationship between the cost of financial governance and asset specificity developed by 
Williamson (1988) and diagrammed by Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) for the case of 
agricultural marketing cooperatives.  
Debt costs (D) are lower at low levels of asset specificity (s) but increase more rap-
idly than equity costs (E) with increasing asset specificity. With increasing asset 
specificity, hybrid financial costs (H) fall between debt and equity costs.  
 
 
Source: Hendrikse and Veerman 2001. 
FIGURE 2. Financial governance and asset specificity 
Cost of 
Financial 
Governance  
Asset Specificity (s) 
H(s) 
E(s) 
D(s)
Product Differentiation and Segregation in Agricultural Systems / 7 
Why are these financial forms of governance important? Farmer members control 
marketing cooperatives, each with one vote. The cost of debt financing increases with 
increasing asset specificity, such as occurs with added segregation costs and investment 
in identity preservation. Because their organizational form does not allow them to cede 
control to the suppliers of equity capital, cooperatives cannot obtain equity financing 
except from their members as asset specificity increases. On the other hand, corpora-
tions and private firms can relinquish control rights in the firm to the financier in 
exchange for more favorable financing terms. Thus, as asset specificity increases, the 
costs of financing the more specific investment increases more slowly for a private firm 
than for a cooperative.  
Application to Product Segregation in Grain Handling 
The transaction-costs framework is based on a partial analysis of firm decisions and 
behavior. Industry structure evolves to minimize transaction costs. Firms with more 
costly processes have to either become more efficient or go bankrupt. The predictive 
power of the transaction-costs framework should improve during periods of significant 
change in costs of marketing or supplying products or in the nature of products marketed, 
such as has happened in the last decade.  
In the Midwest, large numbers of farmers grow grains and oilseeds. Most of the 
grains and oilseeds are commodities that are co-mingled on their way from the farmer to 
the processor or exporter. Farmers compete with each other on a perfectly competitive 
basis, but processors and other grain and oilseed handlers frequently have some degree of 
market power. Co-mingling makes it costly for the processor to sort for specific product 
characteristics. The additional costs make it more difficult for the processor to pay for 
quality traits, and the farmer usually receives the commodity market price. To minimize 
the cost of production, farmers have an incentive to meet just the minimum quality 
standards specified for the commodity grade.  
Segregated product markets, in contrast, allow for purchase of quality-
differentiated inputs or products from identified suppliers. Suppliers may be “identi-
fied” through contractual arrangements, certification, testing, and open market 
transactions of differentiated products. Such quality differentiated and segregated 
products are designed to satisfy specific processor, end-user, and consumer preferences, 
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much like the purchase or acquisition of branded inputs or products. Relative to com-
modities, which are co-mingled in the grain and oilseed handling process, segregated 
inputs and products will have additional transaction costs associated with preserving 
their identity and marketed qualities. 
Two important changes are transforming corn and soybeans, as well as numerous 
other food and pharmaceutical product markets today: the information and biotechnology 
“revolutions.” Biotechnology has reduced the cost and time of developing important new 
traits and characteristics demanded by intermediate users and consumers. The informa-
tion revolution, likewise, has reduced the costs of identifying suppliers, contracting 
production, tracking products, and preserving (e.g., testing, certifying) the qualities of 
inputs and products as they move through the food system. Thus, the combined forces of 
biotechnology and information technology are leading to the rapid introduction of new 
quality-differentiated inputs in the food system.  
Traits that add value to corn and soybeans are being introduced into several feed and 
food markets. The markets that handle these products are having to adjust to differentiate 
products containing these valued traits and to segregate these products from commodity 
corn and soybeans that are typically handled in the same marketing channels. 
In the Midwest, private firms, corporations, and cooperatives have had important 
roles in the commodity corn and oilseed handling system. The implications of new, 
value-added product introductions in the industry have important policy and strategic 
dimensions. Will the growing relative importance of product differentiation and segrega-
tion favor one form of business organization over another form (i.e., private firms versus 
cooperatives)? Will the nature and organization of markets change through increased 
contracting, vertical integration, and lateral coordination? Will the introduction of addi-
tional differentiated products lead to important adjustments in the structure of the 
industry? What can the new institutional economics and the transaction-costs framework 
tell us about the possible evolution of the grain and oilseed market, business organization, 
and industry structure? We begin to address these questions with data from the survey of 
Iowa grain handling practices and costs. 
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Survey and Data 
The Iowa Specialty Crop Survey was conducted in April 2003. The survey instru-
ment designed for the Iowa survey draws on an earlier survey conducted in Illinois (Good 
and Bender 2001). The National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) conducted the 
survey, based on their list of 460 grain-handling firms with operations in the state of 
Iowa. NASS used a mail questionnaire and followed up with a telephone interview for 
those firms that had not responded after two weeks. In total, NASS received mail or 
telephone responses from 380 grain-handling firms in Iowa, an 82 percent response rate.  
Of the 380 firms responding, 68 firms handled one or more corn and soybean spe-
cialty crops. The highest number of specialty crops reported for a single firm was seven. 
Data were collected for all firms on the organizational structure of the firm, size, number 
of satellite operations, and type of firm. For those firms handling specialty corn and 
soybean crops, data were collected on specialty crops handled in 2002, bushels of spe-
cialty crop handled, added transaction costs per bushel of specialty crops, investment 
necessary to handle each specialty crop, source of investment capital, nature of the 
transaction (e.g., contract, open market, premiums) to acquire the specialty crop, quality 
and purity testing of the specialty crop, and future plans for specialty crop handling. 
The summary results of the survey are reported in the next section. The results provide 
a useful overview of the product differentiation and segregation systems currently practiced 
in Iowa and are related to organizational and financial governance and control. 
Survey Results 
Table 1 provides background information on the number of firms by business or-
ganization in our sample, the number of each type of firm handling specialty crops in 
2002, and the number planning to handle specialty crops in 2003.1 A few observations on 
Table 1 may be appropriate. Even though cooperatives accounted for 30 percent of firms 
sampled in 2002, cooperatives accounted for 44 percent of firms handling specialty crops 
and 47 percent of firms planning to handle specialty crops in 2003. Private firms and 
corporations by contrast, accounted for 70 percent of firms in the sample and only 56 
percent of firms handling and 53 percent of firms planning to handle specialty crops.2  
Among firms handling specialty grains reported in Table 2, specialty crops ac-
counted for 9 percent of the total volume of cooperatives handling specialty crops and 28  
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TABLE 1. Number of firms included in the Iowa specialty crop survey, by firms’ 
organization type, 2002 
   Number Handling Specialty Crop 
   2002 Planned 2003 
Organization 
Type 
Number 
Surveyed 
 
Percent 
 
Number 
 
Percent 
 
Number 
 
Percent 
Cooperative 113 30 30 44 34 47 
Private and 
corporate 265 70 38 56 39 53 
Refused 2 1 0 0 0 0 
       
Total 380 100 68 100 73 100 
 
 
TABLE 2. Importance of specialty crops in Iowa, by firms’ organization type, 2002 
Volume of Specialty 
Crops Handled as % 
of Total Volume 
Average Number 
of Specialty Crops 
Reported (n=68) 
 
 
Firm 
Organization 
 
 
Number of 
Respondents 
 
 
 
Percent Average Range Number 
Cooperative 28 45 9 1-100 1.70 
Private and 
corporate 34 55 28 1-100 1.71 
      
All 62 100 19 1-100 1.71 
 
 
percent of the volume in privately owned firms and corporations. Yet, as indicated in 
Table 3, bushels of specialty grains handled by cooperatives averaged 645,000 bushels, 
compared to 289,000 bushels of specialty crops handled  by corporations and privately 
owned firms. Comparing the results with those in Tables 1 and 2, cooperatives tend to 
have a relatively higher probability of handling specialty crops and, on average, of 
handling a larger number of bushels of the specialty products. However, despite the 
greater number of bushels of specialty crops in total for cooperatives (Table 3), the 
volume of specialty crops handled by cooperatives represents a smaller share of total 
volume compared to the share of total volume handled by privately held firms and 
corporations (Table 2). As can be seen from the range statistics in Table 2, some firms in 
all three categories handled specialty crops exclusively. Somewhat surprising is the fact 
that there is no difference between the average number of specialty crops reported by  
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TABLE 3. Average bushels, average added cost, and average investment for speciality 
crops handled, by type of organization, 2002 
 
firm organization type; firms reporting that they handled specialty crops handle slightly 
less than two specialty crops (1.7 crops) on average.  
Table 3 also provides information on average added cost per bushel of specialty crop 
handled. Cooperatives reflect the higher average cost of $0.34/bu, compared to the 
average costs reported by privately owned and corporate firms of $0.31/bu, although 
these average costs are not statistically different. While private and corporate entities do 
have an operating cost advantage, the cooperatives have a lower investment cost per 
bushel of specialty crop at $0.63 compared with the privately owned and corporate firms’ 
investment per bushel at $1.01. Again, these averages are not statistically different. 
Obviously, further analysis is needed to determine the source of the apparent differences.  
Table 4 indicates the types of investments that firms made to segregate specialty 
crops in Iowa. Interestingly, 50 percent of the 68 firms that handled specialty crops 
indicated that they made no additional investment to handle specialty crops. Presumably, 
the reported increase in operating costs covered all additional costs incurred, including 
investment flows. 
In Table 5, we break out added costs and investment per bushel of specialty crop 
handled for the three most frequently reported specialty crops: high-oil corn, non-GM 
corn, and non-GM soybeans. Private and corporate handling costs are lower than those  
 
 
 
Cooperative 
Private and 
Corporate 
 
All 
Volume    
   Number of respondents 28 36 64 
   Average bushels (1,000) 645 289 445 
 
Average additional cost 
   
   Number of respondents 26 30 56 
   Average $/bu/crop 0.34 0.31 0.32 
 
Average investment 
   
   Number of respondents 10 10 20 
   Average $000/crop 36 123 80 
   Average $/bushel 0.63 1.01 0.82 
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TABLE 4. Type of investment made to handle specialty crops in Iowa, 2002 
a Based on cooperatives only (n=30). 
b Based on private and corporate firms only (n=38) 
 
 
TABLE 5. Average added costs and investment incurred for specialty crops by type 
of organization, 2002 
Note: n.r. denotes not reported due to a small number of observations in the cells. 
 
 
Type of Investment 
Percentage of 
Firms 
 
Percentage of 
Cooperativesa 
Percentage of 
Private and 
Corporate Firmsb
None 50 25 25 
Invest added storage 13 4 9 
Invest modify storage 16 4 12 
Invest added dump pits 12 4 7 
Invest added air equip 9 1 7 
Invest modify air equip 12 4 7 
Invest buy testing equip 25 9 16 
Invest add transportation 3 1 1 
Invest personal training 24 10 13 
Invest other 1 - 1 
 Added Costs ($/bu) Investment ($/bu) 
 Average Minimum Maximum 
Firms Investing 
Average 
All Firms 
Average 
High oil corn    (n=7) (n=20) 
  Cooperative 0.29 0.16 0.90 0.32 0.15 
  Private and 
corporate 0.25 0.15 0.43 0.25 0.04 
  All 0.28 0.15 0.90 0.31 0.11 
      
Non-GMO corn     (n=10) 
  Cooperative 0.28 0.09 0.65 n.r. <0.01 
  Private and 
corporate 0.26 0.04 0.74 n.r. <0.01 
  All 0.27 0.04 0.74 n.r. <0.01 
      
Non-GMO soybean    (n=5) (n=41) 
  Cooperative 0.30 0.05 0.45 2.14 0.38 
  Private and 
corporate 0.37 0.02 1.79 2.75 0.23 
  All 0.34 0.02 1.79 2.38 0.29 
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reported by cooperatives for specialty corn but are significantly higher than cooperatives’ 
handling costs for soybeans. A possible explanation is the large investments that corpo-
rate firms are making in product segregation of non-GM soybeans.  
Summary information on grain handling firms’ contracting activities with sellers 
(farmers) and buyers (processors/feed mills) for the three most frequently reported 
specialty crops in our sample—high-oil corn, non-GM corn, and non-GM soybeans—are 
reported in Table 6. In total, over 90 percent of high-oil corn is produced under contracts 
with farmers. Only 45 percent of the non-GM corn and 66 percent of the non-GM soy-
beans are produced under contract with farmers. At the same time, grain handlers have 
about 70 percent of the high-oil corn forward contracted with buyers and over 80 percent 
of the non-GM corn and non-GM soybeans forward contracted. For corn, the private and 
corporate firms did relatively more contracting with farmers and relatively less contract-
ing on the open market. In contrast, cooperatives had relatively more of the non-GM 
soybeans purchased under contract with farmers. 
 
TABLE 6. Marketing practices for high-oil corn, non-GM corn, and non-GM soy-
beans in Iowa, all firms, 2002 
 
Number  
of 
Observations
Overall 
Mean 
 
Cooperative 
Mean 
Private/ 
Corporate 
Mean 
High-oil corn handled (1,000 bu) 19 206 266 103 
Volume purchased on:     
Contract with farmers (%) 20 91 88 96 
Contract with open market (%) 20 10 12 4 
Volume contracted with buyer (%) 15 69 61 84 
Non-GM corn handled (1,000 bu) 10 1,176 2,363 384 
Volume purchased on:     
Contract with farmers (%) 10 45 25 58 
Contract with open market (%) 10 35 50 25 
Volume contracted with buyer (%) 7 89 73 100 
Non-GM soybeans (1,000 bu) 37 84 110 65 
Volume purchased on:     
Contract with farmers (%) 39 66 74 60 
Contract with open market (%) 39 34 26 40 
Volume contracted with buyer (%) 30 83 81 85 
 
 
14 / Miranowski, Jensen, Batres-Marquez, and Ishdorj 
Summary and Implications 
Historically, cooperative, private, and corporate forms of business organization have 
played an important role in the commodity grain and oilseed handling industry in the 
Midwest. Factors such as the revolutions in information and biotechnology are poised to 
bring about significant adjustments in the industry during the coming decades. We are 
moving toward more demand for product differentiation and segregation in grain and 
oilseed specialty crops and gradually away from a commodity-based industry. With these 
adjustments, we can anticipate that some forms of business organization are better posi-
tioned to benefit from these changes while other forms, such as marketing cooperatives, 
may become more vulnerable. 
This paper provides a preliminary look at a 2003 survey of specialty crop handling 
practices for the state of Iowa. At this time, the results that we report are preliminary and at 
best can be described as casual empiricism. We are in the process of estimating multiple 
regression models to explain differences in the added costs and investments of segregated 
grain handling systems by form of business organization, differences in contracting behav-
ior by form of business organization and implications for integration, differences in 
financing of product segregation and identity-preserving investments, and differences in 
willingness to handle segregated specialty crops by form of business organization. In 
addition, given the objective function of cooperative firms, are they offering a broader 
range of member services (i.e., more specialty crops handled) but with a higher average 
cost of segregation? This avenue needs to be explored. Other factors, such as the volume or 
capacity of firm, the number of satellite elevators, and the relative share of specialty crops 
in the total volume of grains and oilseeds handled, are also being considered. 
Although we have not formally tested any of the transaction-costs hypotheses, the pre-
liminary discussion of the data points leads to some interesting developments. First, 
significant differences in added specialty crop handling costs and investment exist between 
cooperatives and privately held firms and corporations. Second, these differences may lead 
to cooperatives having a competitive advantage in handling specialty soybeans and private 
and corporate firms having an advantage in handling specialty corn. Third, it is unclear if 
the transaction-costs framework is a useful tool for studying the evolution of the agricul-
tural marketing system and industry structure. Only a more thorough analysis of the survey 
data will make it possible for us to draw definitive conclusions. 
  
Endnotes 
1. It is important to note that the survey was conducted in April 2003 and should reflect 
quite certain plans. 
2. In terms of capacity by form of business organization, there are several small eleva-
tors in both the privately owned and corporation categories. Among the largest firms 
are three regional cooperatives and two corporations. 
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